Two-dimensional approaches to semantics, broadly understood, recognize two "dimensions" of the meaning or content of linguistic items. On these approaches, expressions and their utterances are associated with two different sorts of semantic values, which play different explanatory roles. Typically, one semantic value is associated with reference and ordinary truth-conditions, while the other is associated with the way that reference and truth-conditions depend on the external world. The second sort of semantic value is often held to play a distinctive role in analyzing matters of cognitive significance and/or context-dependence.
the intension of 'Don Bradman' picks out whoever is Bradman in a world. The intension of a general term maps a possible world to the class of individuals that fall under the term in that world: the intension of 'cat' maps a possible world to the class of cats in that world.
It can easily happen that two expressions have the same extension but different intensions. For example, Quine's terms 'cordate' (creature with a heart) and 'renate' (creature with a kidney) pick out the same class of individuals in the actual world, so they have the same extension. But there are many possible worlds where they pick out different classes (any possible world in which there are creatures with hearts but no kidneys, for example), so they have different intensions. When two expressions have the same extension and a different intension in this way, the difference in intension usually corresponds to an intuitive difference in meaning. So it is natural to suggest that an expression's intension is at least an aspect of its meaning. Carnap (1947) suggested that an intension behaves in many respects like a Fregean sense, the aspect of an expression's meaning that corresponds to its cognitive significance. For example, it is cognitively significant that all renates are cordates and vice versa (this was a nontrivial empirical discovery about the world), so that 'renate' and 'cordate' should have different Fregean senses. One might naturally suggest that this difference in sense is captured more concretely by a difference in intension, and that this pattern generalizes. For example, one might suppose that when two singular terms are cognitively equivalent (so that 'a=b' is trivial or at least knowable a priori, for example), then their extension will coincide in all possible worlds, so that they will have the same intension. And one might suppose that when two such terms are cognitively distinct (so that 'a=b' is knowable only empirically, for example), then their extensions will differ in some possible world, so that they will have different intensions. If this were the case, the distinction between intension and extension could be seen as a sort of vindication of a Fregean distinction between sense and reference.
However, the work of Kripke (1980) is widely taken to show that no such vindication is possible. According to Kripke, there are many statements that are knowable only empirically, but which are true in all possible worlds. For example, it is an empirical discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus, but there is no possible world in which Hesperus is not Phosphorus (or vice versa), as both Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical to the planet Venus in all possible worlds. If so, then 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' have the same intension (one that picks out the planet Venus in all possible worlds), even though the two terms are cognitively distinct. The same goes for pairs of terms such as 'water' and 'H 2 O': it is an empirical discovery that water is H 2 O, but according to Kripke, both 'water' and 'H 2 Still, there is a strong intuition that the members of these pairs ('Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', 'water' and 'H 2 O', 'I' and 'David Chalmers') differ in some aspect of meaning. Further, there remains a strong intuition that there is some way the world could turn out so that these terms would refer to different things. For example, it seems to be at least epistemically possible (in some broad sense) that these terms might fail to corefer. On the face of it, cognitive differences between the terms is connected in some fashion to the existence of these possibilities. So it is natural to continue to use an analysis in terms of possibility and necessity to capture aspects of these cognitive differences. This is perhaps the guiding idea behind two-dimensional semantics.
Two-dimensional approaches to semantics start from the observation that the extension and even the intension of many of our expressions depend in some fashion on the external world. As things have turned out, my terms 'water' and 'H 2 O' have the same extension, and have the same (Kripkean) intension. But there are ways things could have turned out so that the two terms could have had a different extension, and a different intension. So there is a sense in which for a term like 'water', the term's extension and its Kripkean intension depend on the character of our world. Given that this world is actual, it turns out that 'water' refers to H 2 O, and its Kripkean intension picks out Venus in all possible worlds. But if another world had been actual (e.g. Putnam's Twin Earth world in which XYZ is the clear liquid in the oceans), 'Hesperus' might have referred to something quite different (e.g. XYZ), and it might have had an entirely different Kripkean intension (e.g. one that picks out XYZ in all worlds). This suggests a natural formalization. If an expression's (Kripkean) intension itself depends on the character of the world, then we can represent this dependence by a function from worlds to intensions. As intensions are themselves functions from worlds to extensions, this naturally suggests a two-dimensional structure. We can represent this structure diagramatically as follows: This two-dimensional matrix can be seen as a two-dimensional intension: a function from ordered pairs of worlds to extensions. Such a function is equivalent to a function from worlds to intensions, and seen this way can be regarded as capturing the intuitive idea that a term's intension depends on the character of the actual world. One can also recover the intuitive idea that a term's extension depends on the character of the actual world by examining the "diagonal" of this matrix, i.e. the cells that correspond to the same world considered as actual and as counterfactual. In the example above: where the H 2 O -world is considered as actual and as counterfactual, then 'water' picks out H 2 O, while if the XYZ-world is considered as actual and as counterfactual, then 'water' picks out XYZ. We can say that an expression's "diagonal intension" is a function mapping a world w to the term's extension when w is taken as both actual and as counterfactual. So the diagonal intension of 'water' maps the H 2 O -world to H 2 O, the XYZ-world to XYZ, and so on.
We can then see how pairs of terms with the same extension and the same At this point it must be acknowledged that things are not so simple. A number of different two-dimensional approaches to semantics have been developed in the literature, by Kaplan (1979 Kaplan ( , 1989 , Stalnaker (1978) , Chalmers (1996 Chalmers ( , 2002a Chalmers ( , 2004 , and Jackson (1998), among others; and closely related two-dimensional analysis of modal notions have been put forward by Evans (1977) and by Davies and Humberstone (1981) . These approaches differ greatly in the way that they make the intuitive ideas above precise. They differ, for example, in just what they take the "worlds" in the left column to be, and they differ in their analysis of how a term's intension and/or extension depends on the character of the actual world. As a result, different approaches associate these terms with quite different sorts of twodimensional semantic values, and these semantic values have quite different connections to cognitive significance.
In what follows, I will first go over the two-dimensional approaches pioneered in the 1970s by Kaplan, Stalnaker, Evans, and Davies and Humberstone. 1 Each of these approaches can be seen as sharing some of the formal structure described above, but with quite different conceptual underpinnings. Each of the approaches asserts some sort of connection between two-dimensional semantic values and apriority, but the connection is usually limited in scope, applying to indexicals (Kaplan) and to descriptive names (Evans) , and 'actually'-involving expressions (Davies and Humberstone), while Stalnaker's later work rejects a connection to apriority altogether. I will then describe the more general two-dimensional approach to semantics developed in the 1990s by Chalmers, Jackson, and others. This approach associated two-dimensional semantic values with expressions of all kinds, and asserts a strong general connection between these semantic values and the domain of apriority and cognitive significance. I will close by briefly describing some applications of the framework, and by considering and responding to a number of objections.
Early two-dimensional approaches

Kaplan: Character and content
Perhaps the best-known broadly two-dimensional approach is Kaplan's analysis of the character and content of indexicals (Kaplan 1979 (Kaplan , 1989 . According to Kaplan, his work is partly grounded in work in tense logic by Kamp (1971) and Vlach (1973) , which gives a sort of two-dimensional analysis of the behavior of 'now'. Kaplan applies his analysis to indexicals such as 'I', 'here', and 'now', as well as to demonstratives such as 'this' and 'that'. Kaplan's well-known analysis is described elsewhere in this volume, so I will describe it only briefly here. For Kaplan, the "worlds" involved in the first dimension are contexts of utterance: these can be seen as at least involving the specification of a speaker and a time and place of utterance, within a world. The "worlds" involved on the second dimension are circumstances of evaluation: these are ordinary possible worlds at which the truth of an utterance is to be evaluated.
Consider an expression such as:
( 1) it would be easy enough to do so. If one did so, then 'I am here now' would be associated with a diagonal intension that is necessarily true.) So the character rather than the content seems to reflect the fact that the sentence can be known a priori (or near enough). Likewise, when a true utterance of 'this is that' is cognitively significant, the occurrences of 'this' and 'that' will refer to the same object, but their characters will differ. So at least in these domains, character behaves a little like a
Fregean sense.
This behavior does not extend to other expressions, however. For example, Kaplan holds that names refer to the same individual in any context of utterance.
On this view, co-extensive names such as 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' will have exactly the same character, and an identity such as 'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens' will have a character that yields a true proposition in every context, even though the identity appears to be a posteriori and cognitively significant. Something similar applies to natural kind terms such as 'water'. So on Kaplan's analysis, names and natural kind terms have a "constant character" that is dissociated from their cognitive roles.
One can diagnose the situation by noting that character is most closely tied to the patterns of context-dependence associated with an expression, rather than to the expression's cognitive significance. In the case of indexicals, the patterns of contextdependence of an expression are themselves closely associated with the expression's cognitive significance. But for many other expressions, such as names and natural kind terms, cognitive significance is strongly dissociated from patterns of contextdependence. (The same goes for numerous ordinary context-dependent expressions, such as 'tall'.) As a result, in the general case, Kaplan's framework is better suited to the analysis of the context-dependence of expressions than to an analysis of their cognitive significance.
Stalnaker: Diagonal proposition and proposition expressed
Stalnaker's analysis starts with the idea that although sentences such as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' express necessary truths, they are sometimes used to convey contingent information about the world. Stalnaker (1978) an utterance (e.g., if they know that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' both refer to Venus), and where this knowledge is common ground between speaker and hearer, then the utterance will convey its original propositional content. But if the hearer does not know the meanings of the terms, then the utterance will convey a different content. In particular, it will convey the diagonal proposition of the utterance: here, the proposition that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' expresses a truth. If the common ground between speaker and hearer includes partial knowledge of meaning -say, the knowledge that 'Hesperus' is used to refer to the evening star and that 'Phosphorus' is used to refer to the morning star -then worlds outside this common ground are in effect excluded by presuppositions, and the diagonal proposition will in effect be equivalent to the proposition that the morning star is the evening star (at least across the relevant range of worlds). So in such a context, an assertion of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' will convey the information that the morning star is the evening star.
In his 1978 paper, Stalnaker says that if one defines an operator ' †' such that ' †P' is true iff P has a necessary diagonal proposition, then ' †' is equivalent to the "a priori truth" operator. In later work (e.g. Stalnaker 2004 ), however, he retracts that claim. It is easy to see why. Even paradigmatic a priori claims such as '1+1=2' do not have a necessary diagonal proposition: the diagonal proposition of '1+1=2' is false at a world where '1' refers to 3 and '2' refers to 7, for example. It is true that a statement such as 'Hesperus is the evening star', which is arguably an a priori truth, will have a diagonal
proposition that is true in all worlds in a class that is restricted as in the previous paragraph (by imposing the restriction that 'Hesperus' is used to refer to the evening star). But in this case, it is the restriction that is doing all the work in connecting the diagonal proposition to a priori truth.
Because of this, there is no strong connection between diagonal propositions and a priori truth. There is sometimes a connection between an utterance's diagonal proposition and its cognitive significance, but this connection arises only in certain contexts where certain special restrictions due to limited knowledge of meaning are in force. Because of this, Stalnaker's diagonal propositions cannot be used to ground a two-dimensional approach to the cognitive significance of linguistic items in general. (2) is necessarily true.
Evans' framework has two modal operators, rather than two intensions. The framework does have two semantic values: the proposition expressed by an sentence, which is something like the familiar proposition that is true in all worlds where Whitworth invented the zip, and the content of the sentence, which behaves as characterized above. Neither propositions nor contents are characterized as intensions, but it is easy enough to define intensions in the vicinity. We can say that the superficial intension of S is the set of worlds in which the proposition expressed by S is true: roughly, the set of worlds w such that 'if w had obtained, S would have been the case' is true. We can say that the deep intension of S is the set of worlds in which the content of S is true. In these terms, (2) has a superficial intension that is false at some worlds, but a deep intension that is true at all worlds.
In the case of descriptive names such as 'Julius', deep necessity (as opposed to superficial necessity) seems closely connected to apriority, and deep intensions are closely connected to an expression's cognitive role. It is tempting to extend this connection beyond the case of descriptive names, but Evans does not discuss other expressions, and it is not entirely clear how an extension would go. A more precise analysis of Evans' notion of deep necessity would require a more precise understanding of his notion of "content", which serves as something of an unanalyzed primitive in his 1978 article.
From other work, it seems clear that Evans thinks in the case of ordinary proper names (as opposed to descriptive names), there is a semantic rule that ties a name to its referent, so that the referent is part of the content. Correspondingly, it seems that
Evans held that identities involving ordinary proper names have a content that is necessary, so that an identity such as 'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens' is not only superficially necessary but deeply necessary. If this is right, then the two names involved will have the same deep intension. So in these cases (and probably in analogous cases involving natural kind terms), deep necessity and deep intensions are not as strongly connected to cognitive significance or to apriority as in the case of descriptive names.
Davies and Humberstone: 'Fixedly Actually' and 'Necessarily'
The two-dimensional framework of Davies and Humberstone (1981) is based on an analysis of the operator 'actually' (A). AP is true in a world w iff P is true in the actual world. Davies and Humberstone note that 'P iff AP' is contingent but knowable a priori. They suggest that although the sentence is contingent, there is an intuitive sense in which it is necessary: intuitively, no matter which world turns out to be the actual world, 'P iff AP' will be true. Likewise, for a contingent empirical truth P, AP will be necessary, but there is an intuitive sense in which it is contingent: intuitively, there are some worlds such that if those worlds had been actual, then AP would have been false.
This intuition can be formalized by introducing a "floating" actual world into a possible-worlds model. Instead of simply designating a fixed world as the actual world, we take actuality to be a feature that can attach to different worlds. We can then evaluate sentences in a world w, where a world w' is taken to be actual ("considered as actual"). Or equivalently, we can evaluate sentences at pairs of worlds (w', w), where the first world represents the world that is designated as actual, and the second world represents the world in which the sentence is evaluated (relative to the designation of the first world as actual).
2 Doubly-indexed evaluation behaves as follows. A sentence P without modal operators is true at (w', w) iff P is true at w according to ordinary singly-indexed evaluation. P is true at (w', w) iff P is true at (w', v) for all v (i.e. iff P is true at all worlds relative to w' considered as actual). AP is true at (w', w) iff P is true at (w', w) (i.e. iff P is true at w' when w' is considered as actual). In conjunction with the obvious semantics for truth-functional logical operators, this suffices to recursively define doubly-indexed evaluation of sentences in modal propositional logic (including '' and 'A') in terms of standard singly-indexed evaluation of atomic sentences.
Davies and Humberstone then introduce the further operator "fixedly" (F), which can be defined as follows: FP is true at (w', w) iff P is true at (v, w) for all v (i.e. iff P is true at w relative to all worlds considered as actual). The "fixedly actually" operator
i.e., iff P is true at (v, v) for all v. So FAP is true iff P is true at all worlds w when w itself is considered as actual.
The two crucial modal operators here are  and FA. We can say that P is necessary when P is true (i.e. when P is true at all worlds when our world is considered as actual), and that P is FA-necessary when FAP is true (i.e. when P is true at all worlds w when w is considered as actual). Let us say that P is A-involving iff P contains an instance of A or of F. It is easy to see that when P is not Ainvolving, P will be FA-necessary iff it is necessary. But when P is A-involving, the two may come apart. In particular, the sentence 'P iff AP' is not necessary, but it is FA-necessary. Likewise, for a contingent atomic truth P, AP is necessary, but it is FA-contingent. So Davies and Humberstone suggest that FA-necessity captures the intuitive sense in which these two sentences are necessary and contingent respectively.
Davies and Humberstone also extend the discussion to Evans' case of descriptive names. They observe that descriptive names such as 'Julius' behave very much like A-involving descriptions of the form 'The actual inventor of the zip'. For example, just as 'Julius invented the zip' seems contingent and a priori, 'The actual inventor of the zip invented the zip' seems contingent and a priori. Furthermore, it is easy to see that when formalized in modal predicate logic, sentences of the latter form are not necessary but are FA-necessary. This mirrors Evans' claim that 'Julius (if he exists)
invented the zip' is not superficially necessary but is deeply necessary.
Davies and Humberstone suggest the natural hypothesis that descriptive names are in fact abbreviated A-involving descriptions, and that Evans' deep necessity is just FA-necessity.
Davies and Humberstone speculate that all contingent a priori sentences may be (perhaps tacitly) A-involving sentences that are contingent and FA-necessary. 3 They also suggest that some necessary a posteriori sentences are A-involving sentences that are necessary and FA-contingent: for example, 'The actual
is contingent) and analogous claims involving descriptive names. They speculate tentatively that natural kind terms (such as 'water') might be seen as abbreviated Ainvolving descriptions (such as 'the actual waterish stuff around here'), in which case necessary a posteriori identities such as 'water is H 2 O' may also be necessary and FA-contingent. However, they do not extend the claim to all necessary a posteriori sentences. In particular, they hold that ordinary proper names are not Ainvolving, so that identities involving ordinary proper names (such as 'John is Tom') are FA-necessary iff they are necessary. It follows from this that necessary a posteriori identities involving these names are FA-necessary, rather than FA-contingent.
Davies and Humberstone do not posit two semantic values to go along with their two modal operators, but one could naturally do so. We can say that the standard intension of P is true at w iff P is true at w when our world is considered as actual (i.e.
iff P is true at (a, w), where a is the actual world), and that the FA-intension of P is true w iff P is true at w when w is considered as actual (i.e. iff P is true at (w, w)). We can also define the two-dimensional intension of P in the obvious way; then the FAintension will be equivalent to the "diagonal" of the two-dimensional intension.
As defined here, FA-intensions are closely tied to apriority for some sentences:
especially for A-involving sentences, and for tacitly A-involving sentences such as those involving descriptive names and perhaps natural kind terms (if these are indeed tacitly A-involving). If the "actually" operator were the only source of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori, then there would be a strong general tie between FA-intensions and apriority. But if there are other sources of the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori (such as ordinary proper names and indexicals), then in these cases, FA-intensions will not be closely tied to apriority at all.
Two-Dimensionalism
The two-dimensional approaches discussed above all introduce "firstdimensional" semantic values or modal notions that are more strongly connected to apriority and to cognitive significance than are the more familiar "seconddimensional" semantic values and modal notions. But in each of these approaches, the connection is somewhat attenuated. In the case of Kaplan's character, the connection only applies in the case of indexicals. In the case of Evans it is asserted only for descriptive names. In the case of Davies and Humberstone, it holds only for Ainvolving expressions and tacitly A-involving expressions such as descriptive names and perhaps some natural kind terms. In the case of Stalnaker, it applies only under certain strong restrictions on the domain of a diagonal proposition, or not at all.
In recent years, a number of philosophers (e.g. Chalmers 1996 and Jackson 1998 ; see also Braddon-Mitchell 2004 , Lewis 1993 , and Wong 1996 have advocated a two-dimensional approach on which first-dimensional semantic values are connected to apriority and cognitive significance in a much stronger and more general way. On this approach, the framework applies not just to indexicals and descriptive names, but to expressions of all sorts. Proponents hold that any expression (or at least, any expression token of the sort that is a candidate for having an extension) can be associated with an intension that is strongly tied to the role of the expression in reasoning and in thought. The term two-dimensionalism is usually used for views of this sort.
The core claims of two-dimensionalism
Five core claims of two-dimensionalism are as follows.
(T1) Every expression token (of the sort that is a candidate to have an extension) is associated with a primary intension, a secondary intension, and a two-dimensional intension. A primary intension is a function from scenarios to extensions. A secondary intension is a function from possible worlds to extensions. A two-dimensional intension is a function from ordered pairs of scenarios and worlds to extensions.
(T2) When the extension of a complex expression token depends compositionally on the extensions of its part, the value of each of its intensions at an index (world, scenario, or ordered pair) depends in the same way on the values of the corresponding intensions of its parts at that index.
(T3) The extension of an expression token coincides with the value of its primary intension at the scenario of utterance and with the value of the secondary intension at the world of utterance.
(T4) A sentence token S is metaphysically necessary iff the secondary intension of S is true at all worlds.
(T5) A sentence token S is a priori (epistemically necessary) iff the primary intension of S is true at all scenarios.
In what follows I will first clarify and motivate these principles, without precisely defining all of the key notions or making a case for their truth. In later sections, I will discuss how the relevant notions (especially the notion of a primary intension) can be defined, in such a way that the principles might be true. These principles should not be taken to provide an exhaustive characterization of twodimensionalism, but they lie at the core of the view.
Start with claim (T1). Here, a scenario is something akin to a possible world, but it need not be a possible world. In the most common two-dimensionalist treatments, a scenario is a centered world: an ordered triple of a possible world along with an individual and a time in that world. Other treatments of scenarios are possible (see Thesis (T1) also holds that expression tokens can be associated with a twodimensional intension: roughly, a function from (scenario, world) pairs to extensions.
We can then say that at least on the centered worlds understanding, the primary intension coincides with the "diagonal" of the two-dimensional intension (i.e. the value of S's primary intension at a centered world w coincides with the value of S's two-dimensional intension at the pair (w, w*), where w*is the possible-world element of w). Likewise, the secondary intension coincides with the "row" of the twodimensional intension determined by the scenario of an utterance (i.e. the value of S's secondary intension at a world w coincides with the value of S's two-dimensional intension at (a, w), where a is the scenario of utterance). However, for most purposes the two-dimensional intension of an expression is somewhat less important than its primary and secondary intension, and the two-dimensionalist need not hold that an expression's primary and secondary intension are derivative from its two-dimensional intension.
Thesis (T2) says that the primary and secondary intensions of a complex expression depend on the primary and secondary intensions of its parts according to the natural compositional semantics. For example, the primary intension of 'I am Julius' will be true at a scenario if the individual at the center of that scenario is the inventor of the zip in that scenario.
Thesis (T3) states a natural connection between the intensions and the extension of an expression token. This thesis requires that for every utterance, just as there is one world that is the world of the utterance, there is also one scenario that is the scenario of the utterance. If scenarios are understood as centered worlds, this will be a world centered on the speaker and the time of the utterance. When evaluated at the scenario and world of utterance, the primary and secondary intensions (respectively) of an expression token will coincide with the extension of the expression token. At other worlds and scenarios, however, the values of these intensions may diverge from the original extension, and from each other.
Turning to claims (T4) and (T5): Here, we can say that S is a priori when it expresses a thought that can be justified independently of experiences. S is metaphysically necessary when it is true with respect to all counterfactual worlds (under the standard Kripkean evaluation). Thesis (T4) is a consequence of the standard understanding of metaphysical necessity and the corresponding intensions.
Thesis (T5) is intended to be an analog of thesis (T4) in the epistemic domain.
Thesis (T5) is the distinctive claim of two-dimensionalism. It asserts a very strong and general connection between primary intensions and apriority, one much stronger than obtains with the other two-dimensional frameworks discussed earlier. It is possible that a two-dimensionalist might grant some limited exceptions to thesis (T5) (say, for certain complex mathematical statements that are true but unknowable)
while still remaining recognizably two-dimensionalist. But it is crucial to the twodimensionalist position that typical a posteriori identities involving proper names or natural kind terms, such as 'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens' or 'water is H 2 O', have a primary intension that is false in some scenario.
Consequences of the previous theses include the following:
(T6) A sentence token S is necessary a posteriori iff the secondary intension of S is true at all worlds but the primary intension of S is false at some scenario.
(T7) A sentence token S is contingent a priori iff the primary intension of S is true at all scenarios but the secondary intension of S is false at some world.
So two-dimensionalism proposes a unified analysis of the necessary a posteriori:
all such sentences have a necessary secondary intension but a contingent primary intension. Likewise, it proposes a unified analysis of the contingent a priori: all such sentences have a contingent primary intension but a necessary secondary intension.
From the previous theses, one can also draw the following conclusions about the primary and secondary intensions of both sentential and subsentential expressions. 
Epistemic two-dimensionalism
For these claims, especially claim (T5), to be grounded, we need to have a better idea of what primary intensions are. Clearly, they must differ from characters, diagonal propositions, deep intensions, and FA-intensions, at least as these are understood by their proponents. Here, I will outline one approach (the approach I favor) to understanding primary intensions. This approach, which we might call epistemic two-dimensionalism, is elaborated in much greater detail in other works (Chalmers 2002a (Chalmers , 2002b (Chalmers , 2004 (Chalmers , 2006 Chalmers and Jackson 2001) .
According to epistemic two-dimensionalism, the connection between primary intension and epistemic notions such as apriority requires that primary intensions should be characterized in epistemic terms from the start. On this approach, the scenarios that are in the domain of a primary intension do not represent contexts of utterance. Rather, they represent epistemic possibilities: highly specific hypotheses about the character of our world that are not ruled out a priori. The value of an expression's primary intension at a scenario reflects a speaker's rational judgments involving the expression, under the hypothesis that the epistemic possibility in question actually obtains.
For example, 'water is not H 2 O' is epistemically possible, in the sense that its truth is not ruled out a priori. Correspondingly, it is epistemically possible that our world is the XYZ-world (or at least, that it is qualitatively just like the XYZ-world).
And if we suppose that our world is the XYZ-world (that is, that the liquid in the oceans and lakes is XYZ, and so on), then we should rationally endorse the claim 'water is XYZ', and we should rationally reject the claim 'water is H 2 O'. So the primary intension of 'water is H 2 O' is false at the XYZ-world, and the primary intension of 'water is XYZ' is true there.
Likewise, 'Mark Twain is not Samuel Clemens' is epistemically possible, in the sense that it is not ruled out a priori. Correspondingly, it is epistemically possible that our world is a world w where one person wrote the books such as Tom Sawyer that we associate with the name 'Mark Twain', and a quite distinct person is causally connected to our use of the term 'Samuel Clemens'. If we suppose that w is our world, then we should rationally endorse the claim 'Mark Twain is not Samuel Clemens'. So the primary intension of 'Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens' is false at w.
According to two-dimensionalism, something similar applies to any Kripkean a posteriori necessity. For any such sentence S, the negation of S is epistemically possible. And it is plausible that for any such S, there is a world w such that if we suppose that our world is qualitatively like w, we should rationally reject S. If so, then the primary intension of S is false at w. If this pattern generalizes to all a posteriori necessary sentences, then any such sentence has a primary intension that is false at some scenario, as thesis (T6) above suggests. (witness 'X is the source of heat sensations' and 'X is heat'). We simply have to strongly distinguish this sort of epistemic evaluation of sentences in worlds (which turns on epistemic necessitation) from the usual sort of counterfactual evaluation (which turns on metaphysical necessitation). Primary intensions are grounded in the former; secondary intensions are grounded in the latter.
Defining primary intensions
It remains to define primary intensions more precisely. To generalize from the above, we might suggest that the primary intension of a sentence S is true at a scenario w iff the hypothesis that w is actual should lead us to rationally endorse S.
Somewhat more carefully, we can say that the primary intension of S is true at a To handle these claims about self-location, we model epistemic possibilities using centered worlds. The individual and the time marked at the "center" of a centered world serve as a "you are here" marker, which serves to settle these claims about self-location. For a given thinker, the hypothesis that a given centered world w is actual can be seen as the hypothesis: 'D is the case, I am F, and the current time is G', where D is a complete qualitative characterization of w, and F and G are qualitative descriptions that pick out the individual and the time at the center of w. We can think of this conjunctive claim as a canonical specification of the centered world in question.
In the foregoing, a qualitative vocabulary is, to a first approximation, a vocabulary that is free of terms (such as names and natural kind terms) that give rise We also need to define epistemic necessitation. To a first approximation, we can say that D epistemically necessitates S iff accepting D should lead one to rationally endorse S (without needing further empirical information, given idealized reflection).
On a refined definition, we can say that D epistemically necessitates S iff a conditional of the form 'D ⊃ S' is a priori. The refined definition is arguably better in some difficult cases, but for many purposes, the first approximation will suffice.
Because they are defined in epistemic terms, there is an inbuilt connection between primary intensions and the epistemic domain. In particular, there will be a strong connection to apriority. When a sentence token S is a priori, then it will be epistemically necessitated by any sentence whatsoever (this is especially clear for the second understanding of epistemic necessitation above), so its primary intension will be true in all scenarios. When a sentence token S is not a priori, then its negation will be epistemically possible, and S will be false relative to some highly specific epistemic possibility. As long as there is a scenario for every epistemic possibility, then the primary intension of S will be false in some scenario. 
The roots of epistemic two-dimensionalism
The epistemic two-dimensional framework is grounded in a thesis about the scrutability of reference and truth: once a subject is given enough information about the character of the actual world, then they are in a position to make rational judgments about what their expressions refer to and whether their utterances are true.
For example, once we are given enough information about the appearance, behavior, composition, and distribution of various substances in our environment, as well as about their relations to ourselves, then we are in a position to conclude (without needing further empirical information) that water is H 2 O. And if instead we were given quite different information, characterizing our environment as a "Twin Earth" environment, then we would be in a position to conclude that water is XYZ.
Of course, if we allow the "enough information" to include arbitrary truths, such as 'water is H 2 O', the scrutability claim will be trivial. But we can impose significant restrictions on the information without compromising the plausibility of the thesis.
For example, one can argue that even if we restrict ourselves to truths that do not use the term 'water' or cognates, it remains the case that given enough truths of this kind, we are in a position to know the truth of 'water is H 2 O' (see Chalmers and Jackson 2001) . The same goes for many or most other terms, plausibly including most names or natural kind terms.
The upshot is that there is some reasonably restricted vocabulary V, such that for arbitrary statements T, then once we know enough V-truths we will be in a position to know (without needing further empirical information) the truth-value of T. Just how restricted such a vocabulary can be is an open question. Chalmers and Jackson (2001) argue that PQTI, a conjunction of microphysical, phenomenal, and indexical truths along with a "that's all" truth, can serve as a basis. But this claim is not required here.
All that is required for present purposes is that some qualitative vocabulary, conjoined with indexical terms such as 'I' and 'now', is sufficient.
4
This suggests that for any true sentence token S, there is a V-truth D such that D epistemically necessitates S, in that a subject given the information that D will be in a position to rationally endorse S (given ideal rational reflection). Furthermore, it appears that in principle, no further empirical information is needed to make this judgment; if such information were required, we could simply include it (or equivalent qualitative information) in D to start with. This strongly suggests that there is a non-empirical warrant for the transition from D to S. In particular, one can make the case that in these cases, the material conditional 'D ⊃ S' will be a priori.
(This case is made at length by Chalmers and Jackson 2001). If this is correct, then D
epistemically necessitates S in the second, stronger sense given above. 4 As before, a qualitative vocabulary is one that excludes terms, such as names and natural kind terms that give rise to Kripkean a posteriori necessities. A qualitative vocabulary may include all sorts of high-level expressions: 'friend', 'philosopher', 'action', 'believe', and 'square', for example. It will not designate individuals by using names: instead it will make existential claims of the form 'there exist such-and-such individuals with such-and-such qualitative properties'. Some theoretical terms (perhaps including microphysical terms) may be excluded, but information conveyed using these terms can instead be conveyed by the familiar Ramsey-sentence method, characterizing a network of entities and properties with appropriate causal/nomic connections to each other and to the observational and the phenomenal. For familiar reasons, no important information is lost by doing this.
The scrutability claim does not apply only to the actual world. It is plausible that for all sorts of scenarios, if we are given the information that the scenario is actual, then we are in a position to make a rational judgment about the truth-value of arbitrary sentences. For example, if we are given a complete qualitative characterization of the bodies visible in the sky at various times, with the feature that no body is visible both in the morning sky and the evening sky, then we should rationally reject the claim 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. This sort of judgment is part of the inferential role associated with our use of the terms 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'.
The point is general: for any expression that we use, then given sufficient information about the actual world, certain judgments using the expression will be irrational, and certain other judgments using the expression will be rational. It is arguable that the expressions of any language user will have this sort of normative inferential role. This is just part of what being a language user involves.
It is this sort of inferential role that grounds the primary intension of an arbitrary expression (as used by an arbitrary speaker). A given sentence token will be associated with a raft of conditional rational judgments, across a wide variety of scenarios. This raft of conditional judgments corresponds to the sentence's primary intension. Something very similar applies to subsentential expressions: for a singular term, for example, there will be a raft of conditional rational judgments using the expression across a wide variety of scenarios, and these can be used to define the extension of the expression relative to those scenarios (see Chalmers 2004) . So we will have substantial primary intensions for a wide range of sentential and subsential expression tokens.
It should be noted that nothing here requires that the expressions in question be definable in simpler terms (such as in qualitative terms), or that they be equivalent to descriptions (even to rigidified or "actually"-involving descriptions). The inferential roles in question will exist whether or not the term is definable and whether or not it is equivalent to a description (for more on this, see Jackson 2001 and Chalmers 2002a ).
These claims are quite compatible with Kripke's epistemological argument that terms such as 'Gödel' are not equivalent to descriptions. In effect, Kripke describes a scenario w where someone called 'Schmidt' proved the incompleteness of arithmetic, and then it was stolen by someone called 'Gödel' who moved to Princeton, and so on.
Kripke's argument might be put by saying that (i) w is not ruled out a priori, and (ii) if we accept that w obtains, we should reject the claim 'Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic', so (iii) 'Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic' is not a priori. A two-dimensionalist will put this by saying that the primary intension of 'Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic' is false at w, so that the primary intension of 'Gödel' differs from that of 'the prover of the incompleteness of arithmetic'. If Kripke's argument generalizes to other descriptions, it will follow that the primary intension of Gödel is not equivalent to the primary intension of any such description. But nothing here begins to suggest that 'Gödel' lacks a primary intension.
Although the primary intension of an expression may not be equivalent to that of a description, one can often at least approximately characterize an expression's primary intension using a description. For example, one might roughly characterize the primary intension of a typical use of 'water' by saying that in a centered world w, it picks out the dominant clear, drinkable liquid with which the individual at the center of w is acquainted. And one might roughly characterize the primary intension of 'Gödel' by saying that it picks out that individual who was called 'Gödel' by those from whom the individual at the center acquired the name. But these characterizations will usually be imperfect, and it will be possible to find Kripke-style counterexamples to them. Ultimately a primary intension is not grounded in any description, but rather is grounded in an expression's inferential role.
Two-dimensionalism and semantic pluralism
Two-dimensionalism is naturally combined with a semantic pluralism, according to which expressions and utterances can be associated with many different semantic (or quasi-semantic) values, by many different semantic (or quasi-semantic) relations.
On this view, there should be no question about whether the primary intension of the secondary intension is the content of an utterance. Both can be systematically associated with utterances, and both can play some of the roles that we want contents to play. Furthermore, there will certainly be explanatory roles that neither of them play, so two-dimensionalism should not be seen as offering an exhaustive account of the content of an utterance. Rather, it is characterizing some aspects of utterance content, aspects that can play a useful role in the epistemic and modal domains.
Likewise, there should be no question about which of the two-dimensional frameworks described in this paper is the "correct" framework. Samuel Clemens' will be contingent. Unlike diagonal propositions, the primary intension of an a priori sentence such as '2+2=4' will be necessary.
These differences arise from the differences in the way the semantic relations are Even if they are not always part of linguistic meaning, primary intensions are nevertheless a sort of truth-conditional content. The primary intension of an utterance yields a condition under which the utterance will be true. For example, the primary intension of 'there is water in the glass' will be true at some scenarios and false at others, and the utterance will be true iff the primary intension is true at the scenario of the utterance (roughly, if the glass picked out by the individual at the center of the scenario contains the dominant watery stuff in the environment around the center).
This can be seen as an epistemic truth-condition for the utterance, specifying how the truth of the utterance depends (epistemically) on which epistemically possible scenario turns out to be actual. This contrasts with the "metaphysical" truth-condition corresponding to the secondary intension, which might be seen as specifying how the truth of the utterance depends (metaphysically) on which metaphysically possible world is actual. Again, there is no need to decide the question of which of these is the truth-condition associated with an utterance.
Are primary intensions a sort of semantic content? This depends on how we understand the notion of semantic content. If we stipulate that the semantic content of an utterance is truth-conditional content, then primary intensions are a variety of semantic content. On the other hand, if we stipulate that semantic content is linguistic meaning in the sense above, or that semantic content is always associated with expression types and not tokens, then primary intensions are not in general part of semantic content (though they may be part of semantic content for some expressions, such as some indexicals and qualitative expressions). In any case, once we are clear on the various properties of these intensions, nothing important to the framework turns on the terminological question of whether they count as "semantic".
A semantic pluralist can allow that for some explanatory purposes, it may be useful to modify two-dimensionalist semantic values in some respects. For example, one might define the structured primary intension of a complex expression as a structured entity involving the primary intensions of the simple expressions involved in the expression's logical form. One might likewise define structured secondary and two-dimensional intensions. Given compositionality, a structured primary intension will determine an unstructured primary intension (and likewise for the other intensions), but the reverse need not be the case. This means that structured primary intensions are more fine-grained than unstructured primary intensions: for example, all a priori truths will have the same unstructured primary intension (one that is true at all scenarios), but they will have different structured primary intensions. The finegrainedness of structured intensions makes a difference for certain purposes, described below.
What are propositions, according to two-dimensionalism? Some twodimensionalists (e.g. Jackson 1998) hold that propositions are sets of possible worlds, in which case a given utterance expresses two propositions (a primary proposition and a secondary proposition). This view is naturally combined with the view that there are no necessary a posteriori propositions: necessary a posteriori sentences have a primary proposition that is contingent and knowable only a posteriori, and a secondary proposition that is necessary and knowable a priori. Other twodimensionalists may hold that propositions have more structure than this. For example, one could hold that propositions are structured entities involving both the primary and secondary intensions (and/or perhaps the two-dimensional intension) of the simple expressions involved. A two-dimensionalist of this sort may allow that there are necessary a posteriori propositions.
A semantic pluralist view tends to suggest that there are numerous entities which can play some of the explanatory roles that propositions are supposed to play, and that there is no need to settle which of these best deserves the label 'proposition'. My own view is that if one were forced to identify propositions with one sort of entity that can be modeled in the framework, there would be a good case for choosing structured two-dimensional entities of some sort (perhaps those discussed as candidates for
Fregean senses, below). But one might also allow that at least for some purposes,
propositions should be seen as entities more fine-grained than any two-dimensional objects, so that propositions can be associated with intensions without themselves being intensions. In any case, core two-dimensionalism as characterized above is compatible with a wide range of views here.
Applications of two-dimensionalism
I will briefly sketch some applications of the two-dimensionalism outlined in the previous section. (ii) Contents of thoughts (Chalmers 2002b) . One can extend the framework above so that primary and secondary intensions are not just associated with sentences but with thoughts, where these are understood as occurrent mental states. For example, my thought water is H 2 O will have a contingent primary intension (false in the XYZscenario) but a necessary secondary intension. One can then argue that a thought's primary intension is a sort of narrow content: content that is shared between intrinsically identical thinkers. For example, when Oscar on Earth and Twin Oscar on Twin Earth say 'water is wet', the thoughts they express will have different secondary intensions (so secondary intensions are a sort of "wide content"), but they will have the same primary intension. This analysis is closely related to "hidden-indexical" analyses of belief ascriptions, with primary intensions playing the role of "modes of presentation".
One can also use primary intensions to give an analysis of de re attitude ascriptions, in the style of Kaplan 1968.
A de re attitude ascription 'S believes of X that it is F' is true iff S has a belief with the secondary intension of 'X is F', and which picks out the referent of X under a de re-appropriate primary intension.
Here, the conditions on a de re-appropriate primary intension may again be context-independent, but to a first approximation we can think of such an intension as one that is acquaintance-entailing: necessarily, if a subject S has a state with a de reappropriate primary intension that picks out extension E, then S will be acquainted with E.
(iv) Indicative conditionals (Weatherson 2001) : We can also use epistemic twodimensionalism to give a possible-worlds-style analysis of the intuitive acceptabilityconditions of indicative conditionals that is analogous to the familiar Lewis-Stalnaker analysis of subjunctive conditionals.
A token of an indicative conditional 'If P, then Q' is acceptable iff the epistemically closest scenario satisfying the primary intension of 'P' (in the mouth of the speaker) also satisfies the primary intension of 'Q'.
Of course an elaboration of this account requires an elaboration of what epistemic closeness amounts to. But given that the familiar Ramsey Test for the acceptability of an indicative conditionals is defined in epistemic terms (if one conditionally accepts P, should one rationally conclude Q?), and given that primary intensions are defined in very similar terms, it is not surprising that there is a close relation.
(v) Conceivability and possibility (Chalmers 2002) : If thesis (T5) is correct, it licenses a certain sort of move from conceivability to possibility. Let us say that S is conceivable when it is epistemically possible: that is, when S is not ruled out a priori. If T5 is correct, then when S is conceivable, the primary intension of S will be true at some scenario. If scenarios are centered worlds, then there will be some centered (metaphysically possible) world w satisfying the primary intension of S. This does not entail that S is metaphysically possible, but it nevertheless allows us to draw conclusions about metaphysical possible worlds from premises about conceivability.
Reasoning of this sort is central to some uses of conceivability arguments in the philosophy of mind (e.g. in Chalmers 1996) .
Objections to two-dimensionalism
A number of objections to two-dimensionalism have been made in the literature.
Some objections (the first nine considered here) rest on the attribution of views to which two-dimensionalism is not committed. They might be considered objections to certain versions of two-dimensionalism, but they do not apply to the epistemic twodimensionalism that I have outlined. Other objections (the next two considered here)
show that the claims of two-dimensionalism must be restricted in certain respects.
Still others (the last three considered here) raise substantive issues whose adjudication is an ongoing project.
What is held constant? (Block and Stalnaker 1999 Response: Two-dimensionalism does not entail that names and natural kind terms are rigidified descriptions. We have noted already that Kripke's epistemic arguments are accommodated by the observation that primary intensions cannot always be encapsulated into a description. Furthermore, as noted above, it is consistent with two-dimensionalism to hold that names and natural kind terms, unlike rigidified descriptions, have the same referent in any context of utterance. It is also consistent with two-dimensionalism to hold that the primary intension of a name or natural kind term may vary between speakers. The account of belief ascriptions given above does not entail that names will behave like rigidified descriptions in belief contexts, and handles the relevant data straightforwardly. (Byrne and Pryor 2005; Schiffer 2003 ).
Speakers lack identifying knowledge
Two-dimensionalism requires that every name N (at least as used by a speaker) be associated with a "uniqueness property" φ (such that at most one individual has φ), and requires that the speaker have a priori "identifying knowledge" of the form 'N is φ'. But speakers in general lack this sort of knowledge. Response: Two-dimensionalism does not hold that ordinary expressions are ambiguous. 'Water' has exactly the same content in both (3) and (4) above: in both contexts (and in all contexts) it has both a primary intension and a secondary intension (or equivalently, it has a complex semantic value involving both a primary and a secondary intension). This does not entail that 'water' is ambiguous, any more than the distinction between character and content entails that indexicals are ambiguous.
The distinction between (3) and (4) is handled instead by the difference between the modal operators. The semantics of these operators are such that 'It is metaphysically necessary that S' is true when S has a necessary secondary intension, while 'It is epistemically necessary that S' is true when S has a necessary primary intension.
Combined contexts are handled in the obvious combined way. (Soames 2005) : It is natural for two-dimensionalists to hold that 'x believes that S' is true when the subject has a belief whose primary intension is the primary intension of S. But this view gives the wrong result in a number of cases, and no better two-dimensionalist treatment of belief ascriptions is available.
Two-dimensionalism cannot handle belief ascriptions
Response: The view of belief ascriptions mentioned above is considered and rejected in Chalmers (1995; , and to the best of my knowledge no twodimensionalist endorses the view. Smith is William Smith') can be cognitively insignificant for one speaker (e.g. his wife, who uses the two names interchangeably) but not for another (e.g. a colleague who uses the names in quite different domains without knowing that they are coextensive). If so, then the primary intensions of the names will coincide for one speaker but not for another, so that the primary intension of at least one of them must vary across speakers. Primary intensions can also vary for context-dependent terms such as 'tall' and 'heavy'. The moral is that for maximal generality, primary intensions should be associated with expression tokens (or with utterances of expression types) rather than with expression types. Response: A two-dimensionalist can accommodate many of the relevant cases here by invoking structured intensions. This will distinguish between different logical and mathematical truths, for example. The only residual problem will arise if there are pairs of simple expressions that are equivalent a priori but that are cognitively distinct.
Primary intensions
It is not obvious that there are such pairs, but if there are, there is more to meaning than primary intensions. We might say that primary intensions individuate expressions by their idealized cognitive significance, and so do not capture differences in nonidealized cognitive significance. One might try to capture these differences by moving to intensions that are defined over a space of finer-grained epistemic possibilities. Or a two-dimensionalist might simply allow that in addition to intensions, expressions are associated with finer-grained semantic values that lie behind and determine these intensions. But in any case, this point is no threat to the two-dimensionalist who is a semantic pluralist. Primary and secondary intensions are not all there is to meaning, but nevertheless utterances can be associated with primary and secondary intensions, in a way that can play the various explanatory roles described above.
There are epistemic possibilities that correspond to no centered world (Yablo 1999 (Yablo , 2002 . A key two-dimensionalist claim holds that when S is not ruled out a priori, then there is some centered world at which the primary intension of S is true.
This may be so for typical Kripkean a posteriori necessities such as 'water is not H 2 O', but there are other sentences for which the claim false. For example, it may be that the existence (or nonexistence) of a god is necessary without being a priori. If so, 'There is no god' (or 'There is a god') is not ruled out a priori, but it is necessarily
false. There appears to be no relevant difference between primary and secondary intensions here, so the primary intension is true in no possible world. Something similar applies if the laws of nature in our world are the laws of all possible worlds. If these views are correct, then the space of epistemic possibilities outstrips the space of metaphysical possibilities in a way that falsifies the two-dimensionalist claim.
Response: All of these purported counterexamples rest on controversial claims about modality or apriority, and I have argued (Chalmers 1999; ) that none of them succeed. Furthermore, there is good reason to believe that the concept of metaphysical modality itself has roots in the epistemic domain, so that there cannot be "strong necessities" that exhibit this sort of disconnect between epistemic and metaphysical modalities. Still, the existence or nonexistence of strong necessities is a delicate and controversial issue. An alternative version of two-dimensionalism remains neutral on this issue by understanding scenarios not as centered metaphysically possible worlds, but instead as maximal epistemic possibilities (corresponding roughly to maximal epistemically consistent sets of sentences). Then even if no metaphysically possible world verifies 'There is no god', some maximal epistemic possibility will verify 'There is no god', so there will be a scenario at which the primary intension of this sentence will be true. Understood in this neutral way, two-dimensionalism does not ground inferences from conceivability to metaphysical possibility (those inferences will turn on a further claim about the relationship between scenarios and metaphysically possible worlds), but it can still play much the same role as before in the epistemic and semantic domains.
Complete canonical descriptions are not available (Schroeter 2004 ): Epistemic two-dimensionalism requires that there be qualitative descriptions of a given scenario that are complete in that they epistemically determine the truth-value of arbitrary judgments. But there may be some features of the world, such as intrinsic physical features, which cannot be captured in a qualitative description.
Response: It is not clear whether there are intrinsic properties that cannot be captured in a qualitative description, but if there are, this will be irrelevant to epistemically determining the truth-value of any of our sentences. When information about these features is needed to epistemically determine the truth-value of a sentence in a scenario, a qualitative characterization of the features (e.g. an existential or a Ramsey-sentence characterization) will suffice. (Such a characterization may not suffice for metaphysical determination, and for evaluating truth-values of sentences in counterfactual worlds according to their secondary intensions. But qualitative descriptions are only needed for primary intensions.) The minimal size of a vocabulary that can epistemically determine the truth of all sentences is an important open question, but there is good reason to believe that some qualitative (and indexical) vocabulary suffices. It should also be noted that if we take the purely epistemic approach to scenarios described in the previous response, a restriction to qualitative vocabulary is not needed, and so the issue here does not arise.
Objections to the role of apriority (Block and Stalnaker 1999, Yablo 2002) . It is true that there is an epistemic relation between information about the world and claims about reference: for example, given the information that we are in the H 2 Oworld (appropriately characterized) we should conclude that water is H 2 O, and given the information that we are in the XYZ-world, we should conclude that water is XYZ.
And it is true that we can makes these conditional inferences from the armchair, without needing to perform further investigation of the environment. But nevertheless, these inferences are not justified a priori. The inferences are justified in part by background empirical knowledge of the world (Block and Stalnaker) or by "peeking" at our own judgments (Yablo) . As a result, primary intensions are not connected to apriority as strongly as the two-dimensionalist supposes.
Response: Chalmers and Jackson (2001) argue that these connections are in fact a priori: although empirical facts about the world can play a causal role in determining the relevant patterns of inference, there is good reason to believe that they do not play a justifying role. (Chalmers (2002) responds to Yablo.) It is also worth noting that even a skeptic about apriority can use the epistemic two-dimensional framework.
Even if the relevant inferential connections are not a priori, one can still use them to define primary intensions, and the resulting primary intensions will still behave much as they are supposed to (assigning a necessary intension to 'Hesperus is Hesperus' but not to 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', for example. The connection between primary intensions and apriority will be lost, but primary intensions will still be strongly connected to the epistemic domain.
